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Does Labor Market Rigidity Matter for Economic 
Performance? Evidence from the Four Asian Tigers 
 
 
Abstract 
With the increments of labor market institutions, the potential problem caused 
by labor market rigidity is emerging within the four Asian tigers, namely, Hong 
Kong, South Korea, Singapore and Taiwan. This study emphasizes the impact of 
labor market rigidity on economic performance in the four Asian tigers over the 
1980-2010 period. Through the estimation of the aggregate production function, we 
find that labor market rigidity has a negative impact on output and economic growth. 
On the other hand, without imposing any labor market institutional adjustment that 
would lower the standard of labor conditions, the rises in country’s competitiveness 
can serve as a balancing force to mitigate the negative impacts of labor market 
rigidity. A crucial insight for policymakers is to determine the most efficient method 
for giving labor effective protection without hurting economic performance. 
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1. Introduction 
 Over the past several decades, labor market institutions (the so-called regulations 
and, in some sense, rigidity), referring to unemployment insurance, employment 
protection, union and taxwedge, and their impacts on the labor market have 
constituted one of the most high-profile issues prevailing in both Europe and the 
United States. On the one hand, Europe has been through times in which labor market 
rigidity has worsened the unemployment problem as was the case in the 1970s that in 
turn stimulated the labor market reforms which started to take place in the 1990s. On 
the other hand, the United States has by contrast gone through a tradeoff between 
labor market flexibility (which enhances a relatively low unemployment rate) and a 
high degree of wage inequality (Mortensen and Pissarides, 1999; Hornstein and 
Krusell, 2005). Furthermore, Nickell and Layard (1999) indicate that the poorly 
designed labor market institutions (rigid labor market regulations) have become 
outdated and have not only led to a deterioration in the unemployment problem, but 
also to a fall in the economic growth rate. However, the economic growth-labor 
market rigidity nexus has yet been quantitative examined. 
In this study, we argue that the same problem is emerging in the Asian market. 
Table 1 provides a brief glimpse of some of the suspicions raised. It shows the 
evolution of non-wage cost as a percentage of the total compensation cost (NWC% 
hereafter)1 as well as the GDP per capita growth rate of the four Asian tigers over 
that period from 1980 to 2010, averaged over five-year intervals. NWC% rises from 
3.3, 9.9 and 7.4 to 8.5, 17.7 and 14.1 in Hong Kong, South Korea and Taiwan, 
respectively. In the meantime, the growth of GDP per capita, with a few cyclical 
stages in some intervals, declines from 5.3, 6.5 and 5.3 to 3.8, 3.6 and 3.9 over the 
long term. A negative relationship between NWC% and growth is found to exist in 
1 The non-wage cost includes social insurance expenditures and labor-related taxes, which are the 
components associated with the so-called labor market institutions and rigidity. 
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some intervals in Hong Kong (the 1990s), South Korea (1985-1999) and Taiwan 
(1985-2004). Although the NWC% figures in Singapore are in cyclical decline and 
have remained at 13.9 in the latest years, they are still at a level that other countries 
have taken years to reach. The long-run GDP per capita has also declined in 
Singapore. However, we do not rule out the possibility that these incidents are 
shadowed or purely driven by macroeconomic shocks, and thus later in our 
empirical section we include macroeconomic variables to control the aggregate 
shocks and econometric techniques that will help clearly depict the relationship 
between labor market rigidity and productivity. 
While studies that shed light on Asian labor markets are few, an increasing 
number are, however, gradually being published. For example, in India, states with 
labor market institutions that have been modified to be more pro-worker have 
experienced decreases in output, employment, investment and productivity in 
registered or formal manufacturing. In other words, labor market rigidity in India has 
been found to have a negative impact on economic performance because of the rising 
labor costs due to the rigidity and the decreases in foreseen future profit which results 
in reduction of investors’ capital investment (Besley and Burgess, 2004). On the other 
hand, the increases in labor market rigidity in newly-industrializing economies (NIEs) 
in East Asia, namely, Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan are also worth 
noting. Fields (1994) stresses that the rise in labor market institutions are the 
consequences led by the so-called Asian economic miracle that occurred over the 
period from the 1960s to the early 1990s, and during which the labor market 
institutions and conditions were substantially improved. Workers benefited from the 
economic growth during that period of time. However, with the constant increments 
of labor market institutions, we wonder if there are any potentially negative impacts 
on economic performance.  
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Given that there could be a negative impact of labor market rigidity, the direct 
modification of labor market institutions could sometimes be difficult to implement as 
it could shrink workers’ benefits. We wonder if there are alternative solutions that 
would turn the negative effects around instead of the drastic changes in labor market 
institutions. This brings out the other main point of this paper where we argue that the 
increasing international competitiveness resulting from a higher degree of trade 
openness could undermine labor market rigidity and further ease the impact of labor 
market tightness. Nickell and Layard (1999) indicate that encouraging product market 
competition is a key solution to mitigating the negative effects of unions on economic 
performance. For example, unions, one of the so-called labor market institutions that 
cause labor market rigidity, can hold up firms’ investments by resisting innovation in 
production, which leads to a reduction in productivity. International or external 
pressure, brought about for instance by challenges of product market competition or 
the introduction of technological workplace practices, could diminish union power 
and push unions to be more co-operative in terms of enhancing productivity. 
Furthermore, Hasan et al. (2007) and Rodrik (1997) suggest that trade liberalization 
can raise the elasticity of labor demand. Through the substitution and scale effects, the 
increase in openness leads to increases in imports of substitutes goods (for instance, 
semi-finished goods) for domestic labor, which in turn generates greater factor 
demand elasticity. Firms are thus able adjust labor costs by choosing 
favorable/beneficiary factors to offset the increasing labor cost from the rising 
domestic labor market rigidity. In other words, increasing openness to improve 
international competitiveness could to some extend undermine labor market rigidity 
and outweigh the negative impact that labor market rigidity could have on economic 
growth. We thus provide quantitative evidence in a later section regarding this 
viewpoint. 
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This study employs country-level data ranging from 1980 to 2010 for Hong 
Kong, South Korea, Singapore and Taiwan. Empirically, we observe how labor 
market rigidity affects productivity by examining the production function. Secondly, 
we take one- and five-year differences in regard to the productivity function to 
examine the influences of labor market rigidity on economic growth. Finally, we 
look at the interaction between labor market rigidity and openness to observe 
whether improving international competition by encouraging a degree of trade 
openness could offset the effect of labor market rigidity. Furthermore, our 
measurement of labor market rigidity is based on indirect payments (the non-wage 
portion) as a percentage of the total compensation cost (NWC% hereafter) collected 
from the key indicator of labor market dataset (KILM hereafter). The NWC refers to 
hourly social insurance expenditures and labor-related taxes2, which are the main 
components of so-called labor market institutions (rigidity) that in studies usually 
include four dimensions, namely, unemployment insurance, a tax wedge, union 
density and employment legislation (Nickell 1997 and 1998; Nickell and Layard, 
1999; Blanchard and Wolfers, 2000; Nickell, 2003; Nickell et al., 2005). Due to 
limitations on the access to complete individual institutional variables for the four 
Asian tigers and the difficulties associated with compiling a collective labor market 
index, NWC% is an alternative representation of the degree of labor market rigidity. 
The larger that NWC% is, the higher the labor market rigidity. On the other hand, 
we employ the degree of openness3 in accordance with the literature to represent the 
degree of a country’s international competitiveness. In addition, in order to avoid 
arbitrary setting we also employ the terms of trade as a proxy for the 
competitiveness as the robustness check. 
2 Specifically, they are employers’ contributions to compulsory, contractual and private social 
security schemes, pension plans, casualty or life insurance schemes and benefit plans in respect of 
their employees. 
3 The international trade (import and export) share of GDP. 
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We believe that the contributions of this paper are threefold. First of all, by 
employing econometric methods, we examine the potential problem that lies behind 
the increasing labor market rigidity in the four Asian tigers. Secondly, in view of the 
lack of studies that employ data on East Asian countries to discuss the relationship 
between labor market rigidity and growth, this study is an attempt to fill the gap in the 
econometrics literature. Finally, we provide an important policy implication regarding 
how governments cope with the impact brought about by rising labor market rigidity. 
In addition to modifying labor market institutions directly, the alternative solution is 
to improve the competitiveness of countries by increasing the degree of trade 
openness. 
Our empirical results also echo the findings of past studies. First, when 
controlling for specific countries, time effects and macroeconomic shocks, we find 
that NWC% has a negative impact on both output and the economic growth rate. This 
implies that the increased labor market rigidity hampers economic performance. 
Secondly, our time series results also suggest that the marginal effect of rigidity 
towards growth is more intense in Taiwan than in South Korea. It is shown that 
Taiwan labor market is more rigorous than that in South Korea so that when facing 
labor market institutional adjustment, the output in Taiwan is stroke more seriously. 
This is because the adjustment of the labor market regulation, based on negotiations 
between labor, firms and the government, in accordance with the economic 
environment is more efficient in South Korea. The evidence can be seen for in Fig 1, 
which shows that South Korea experienced a dramatic decline in NWC% after 1997, 
the financial crisis, in order to maintain its international competitiveness and 
productivity (a lower labor benefit to cope with the financial crisis), while in Taiwan 
NWC% on the contrary keeps increasing. Moreover, the empirical evidence is even 
more convincing in the sense that we include a very different country, Singapore, 
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within our sample. Singapore has an opposite tendency in terms of the evolution of 
NWC% within our sample, and the inclusion of Singapore reinforces our statement of 
the effects of labor market rigidity on economic performance. Finally, the interaction 
term of NWC% and the degree of openness exhibits a positive sign significantly. This 
suggests that the effect of enhancing a country’s competitiveness could outweigh part 
of the impact of labor market rigidity that is imposed on economic growth.  
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2. Background and Related Literature 
2.1 Background 
In the case of Hong Kong, Fig.1 indicates that NWC% of the total labor cost is 
rising at a low level, from 4% to 5% before 2000 and followed by a substantial jump 
in the year 2000 to 8%. This is because that the labor legislation went through 
extensive modification in order to improve working conditions aimed at applying 
international labor standards between 1997 and 2001. As of 2001, Hong Kong was 
following 40 conventions (including social insurance, workers’ benefits and so forth), 
which exceeded those for most of the countries in the same region. NWC% in Hong 
Kong has maintained an upward trend during our sample years.  
Turning to Singapore, NWC% had its first downturn in 1985, which was related 
to its economic decline. It is said that one of the reasons for the decline was the high 
wage level4. Another downturn occurred around 1997 because of the Asian financial 
crisis. In order to minimize damage from the crisis, the government provided financial 
relief in terms of a reduction in the contribution from the employer to the 
government-run retirement benefits program (Kuruvilla et al., 2002). The 
macroeconomic shocks impacted economic growth and temporarily undermined 
payments to workers and employment benefits. NWC% in Singapore has exhibited a 
cyclical downward trend. Nevertheless, its level has been higher than that in Hong 
Kong or Taiwan. 
On the other hand, NWC% in South Korea remained quite stable before 1988. 
After the democratization in 1987 and the reform of the system of industrial relations 
which relaxed the restrictions on collective bargaining (Fields, 1994; Kim and Topel, 
4 Before 1979, Singapore implemented wage repression in order to maintain its international 
competitiveness; however, the policy failed because it not only dragged down economic growth 
because of the excessive demand for labor but it also lowered living standards. In 1979, the 
government announced a “wage correction”. (Fields, 1994) Wages had since experienced double-digit 
growth and stopped at 1985. 
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1995; Kuruvilla et al., 2002), trade union power upswings and usually successful 
wage bargaining, the nominal wage surges and non-wage cost percentage started to 
rise until 1997 (Betcherman and Islam, 2001). The financial crisis in 1997, 
accompanied by a record high unemployment rate of 8.4% in 1999, accelerated the 
restructuring of the labor market 5  to achieve flexibility in order to maintain 
international competition and therefore caused NWC% to plummet in 1999. However, 
NWC% is still at a relatively high level of around 16%. 
Labor market rigidity in Taiwan has obviously risen with the times regardless of 
any financial crises. The Labor Standards Law was enacted in 1984 and provided 
unions with bargaining power over employment benefits. Further democratization 
(the lifting of Martial Law and democratic reforms) in 1987 gave unions greater 
freedom from central control. Union density rose from 28% to 50% in 1995 
(Kuruvilla et al., 2002). During the democratic transition, political parties started to 
engage in the labor market reforms in order to seek election support. Amendments to 
the labor market legislation thus sprung up (Wang, 2010). In 1992, while still led by a 
political party, the Taiwan Labor Front was founded and advocated improving labor 
conditions. A number of legislative bills were proposed and passed during that time. 
Fig. 4 depicts the rise in the non-wage cost percentage beginning around 1993. A 
slight downturn that occurred around 2000 was related to the domestic information 
technology bubble. 
 
2.2 Literature Review 
Labor market institutions (rigidity) mainly refer to four dimensions, including 
5 Kuruvilla et al. (2002) indicated that a tripartite commission (with labor participation) was held and 
a social pact drawn up which was mainly based on decisions related to industrial relations. The social 
pact included the launching of an unemployment insurance fund, the extension of unemployment 
benefits in terms of duration and amount, and the freedom enjoyed by labor unions to be active 
politically. In addition, legal amendments that allow layoffs in firms and temporary contracts were 
permitted and the practice of paying full-time union leaders was outlawed. 
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unemployment insurance, the tax wedge, union density and employment protection 
legislation (Blanchard and Wolfers, 2000). Increments in unemployment insurance 
and the tax wedge generally reduce workers’ incentives to join the labor market, while 
the rises in union density and employment protection legislation tend to drive up the 
wage rate and labor costs which in turn lower employers’ incentives to create jobs. 
Studies employing these variables to analyze the effect of labor market institutions on 
the unemployment rate are numerous (Nickell 1997 and 1998; Nickell and Layard, 
1999; Blanchard and Wolfers, 2000; Nickell, 2003; Nickell et al., 2005). Nevertheless, 
the literature regarding the quantitative measurement of the impact of these 
institutions on economic growth is quite limited, and this is particularly so when it 
comes to incorporating the data for East Asian countries.  
Labor market institutions could influence the growth rate and output for a 
number of reasons. The first is the relative price effect (Besley and Burgess, 2004). 
The increase in labor regulations will consequently raise labor costs that will cause 
firms to substitute capital or any other labor-saving inputs for labor. The rising labor 
costs also lead to increases in the marginal costs of production and reduce the optimal 
output of firms. Second, when bargaining power (union density) increases, firms’ 
anticipated returns on their investments may not be achieved because of the workers, 
which reduces firms’ incentives to invest and leads to decreases in capital 
accumulation. Furthermore, the states in India with more manufacturing industries 
tend to pass pro-worker legislation (which increases the labor market rigidity) because 
of workers’ vested interests in their own benefits that deter future investment and 
output. Nickell and Layard (1999) and Nickell et al. (2005) also indicate that unions 
can affect output by holding up firms’ investments in various ways, for instance, in 
relation to R&D expenditure, and resist new technology introduced in working 
practices because maintaining old practices enables workers to provide less effort. It 
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is also observed that firms that adopt technological innovation will end up by paying 
more when unions are stronger. Unions have a negative impact on firms’ investment 
(Nickell and Denny, 1992). From the aspect of endogenous growth (Barro et al., 1995; 
Crafts, 2006; Loayza et al., 2005), labor market regulations can also influence the 
accumulation of human and physical capital and form barriers that will slow down 
innovation (the introduction of new technology to replace old technology). In contrast 
to most of the literature that falls short when it comes to giving quantitative estimates 
of the impacts on the growth rate and mainly focuses on the European region, we 
provide econometric evidence and data for Asian countries in our empirical section. 
Given that the share of manufacturing in industry and union density work through 
labor market rigidity to influence output, in a later section we will also consider these 
two variables as instrumental variables to correct for the possible endogeneity 
problem associated with NWC%. 
On the other hand, the existing literature indicates that increasing product market 
competition is a key solution to mitigate the negative impacts of unions (one 
dimension of forming labor market rigidity) on economic performance (Nickell and 
Layard, 1999; Nickell et al., 2005). By increasing external/international exposure, 
firms are able to access new technology, implement a standard competition policy and 
remove anti-competition product market regulations, which soften union power and 
more external pressure is exerted on unions (labor market rigidity is undermined) to 
adopt a more co-operative attitude toward improving productivity. It also suggests 
that unions are more cooperative in terms of productivity improvement when facing 
the threats of consequences (losing jobs or worse) from firms becoming less 
competitive in a more competitive environment. Furthermore, Hasan et al. (2007) and 
Rodrik (1997) suggest that trade liberalization can increase the elasticity of labor 
demand, by which firms are able to avoid impacts of the increasing labor market 
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rigidity (labor costs) through two channels. First, rise the degree of trade liberalization 
increases the degree in openness. Firms are able to import semi-finished or assembly 
goods that require less manpower, which serve as a substitute for domestic labor. By 
this way, firms could elastically adjust their labor demand and costs in accordance 
with the profit, which offset the increases in labor costs brought about by the greater 
labor market rigidity. Secondly, trade liberalization makes it easier for firms to access 
labor substitutions which would reduce the share of labor and fimrs become more 
capital-intensive. Consequently, this will lead to an accumulation of capital and 
further increase their output. Moreover, increases in the degree of openness could also 
increase output in countries that are more international trade-oriented. The rises in 
output and profit could cover the rising labor costs. All in all, the increases in the 
degree of openness to improve international competitiveness could undermine labor 
market rigidity and outweigh the negative impacts that labor market rigidity could 
bring to economic growth. We thus seek to provide quantitative evidence in the 
following sections. 
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3. Data and Methodology 
The econometric analysis requires estimations of the production function. We 
thus follow the aggregate production function to examine the relationship between 
labor market rigidity and output in level and difference specifications. The panel 
data comprise four Asian countries, which are Hong Kong, South Korea, Singapore 
and Taiwan with the time period spanning from 1980 to 2010. Most of the data are 
collected from the Key Indicator of Labor Market dataset (KILM) and World Bank, 
except for the capital stock, which is obtained from the data market that indicates 
that the original data are from the World Bank and are based on constant 2000 US 
dollars. Data for Taiwan are obtained from National Statistics of the R.O.C., which 
is the Taiwan bureaucratic statistics website. The details of the data sources and 
descriptive statistics are provided in Appendix A1. 
By following the production function in Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004) that 
incorporates human capital into the textbook Solow model, our model follows the 
spirit of Bloom et al. (2004, 2010), and Narayan (2010) taking the form: 
Production function: 
𝑌 = 𝐴.𝐾𝛼 .𝐻𝛽 . 𝑒𝛿0𝑁𝑊𝐶%+ 𝛿1 𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠+𝛿2 𝑔𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡+𝛿3 𝐺𝐷𝑃 𝑑𝑒𝑓𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟  (1) 
where Y is output, K denotes physical capital, and H is human capital which 
comprises L, the number of workers, multiplied by h, the typical worker. We classify 
other relevant variables as powers in exponential form. In the following, we take the 
log and per capita form for our estimation purposes: 
Empirical specification of output:  log 𝑦it = 𝛼 log𝑘𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼1log𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼2log𝑙𝑖𝑓𝑒𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼3𝑁𝑊𝐶%𝑖𝑡+ 𝛼4 𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼5𝑔𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡+  𝛼6𝐺𝐷𝑃 𝑑𝑒𝑓𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑡 + 𝑓𝑖 + 𝑑𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡 
(2) 
where 𝑓𝑖  denotes the specific-country fixed effect, and 𝑑𝑡  is the time effect. y 
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represents GDP per capita for country i at time t., and k is the per capita capital stock. h 
splits into two components. In our model, we apply edu, education expenditure as a 
percentage of GDP, and introduce another variable that is often used as one of the 
components of human capital in terms of health, namely, lifeexpec, which denotes life 
expectations (Topel, 1999; Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 2004; Narayan, 2010). NWC% 
denotes the non-wage cost as a percentage of total compensation which represents 
labor market rigidity. The non-wage cost includes employers’ contributions to 
compulsory, contractual and private social security schemes, pension plans, casualty 
or life insurance schemes and benefit plans in respect of their employees which are in 
line with the so-called labor market rigidity in the literature. Still remaining are the 
environmental variables (Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 2004; Bond et al., 2010), of which 
openness is the sum of imports and exports as a percentage of GDP, and evaluates the 
degree of international openness while also representing the country’s external and 
international competitiveness. In addition, government is government consumption as 
a percentage of GDP mainly controls the affect of public institutions, and GDP 
deflator is a price index that is used to capture the influences of inflation combined with 
the effects of the fiscal and monetary policy. Table A1 in the appendix presents variable 
definitions and data sources along with basic statistics. Furthermore, with this 
specification we incorporate union density and the share of manufacturing in GDP 
(Besley and Burgess, 2004) as instrumental variables and the generalized method of 
moments (GMM) as the methodology used to correct for the possible endogeneity 
problem that is related to the omission of other labor market institutional variables or 
measurement errors. In addition, heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation are also 
considered.  
 In order to observe how labor market rigidity directly impacts economic growth, 
following the conventional setting, we take one- and five-year differences for the level 
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of the production function. Moreover, given that the log-differenced process 
transforms the specification into growth form, we follow past studies and growth 
theory to include a lagged term of GDP per capita (Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 2004; 
Caselli, 1996), which captures the convergence effect6: 
Empirical specification of economic growth: 
∆log 𝑦it = 𝛽0𝐿. log 𝑦it + 𝛽1∆log𝑘𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2∆log𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3∆log𝑙𝑖𝑓𝑒𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑡+ 𝛽4∆𝑁𝑊𝐶%𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5 ∆𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑡 +   𝛽6∆𝑔𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡+   𝛽7∆𝐺𝐷𝑃 𝑑𝑒𝑓𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑡 + 𝜑𝑖 + 𝛾𝑡 + 𝑣𝑖𝑡 
(3) 
 Taking a long difference, usually a five- or ten-year difference, also reduces the 
possibility of measurement error in terms of a full adjustment in the variables 
through time (Hasan at el., 2007). Moreover, the growth specification, with a lag 
term of GDP per capita, which is correlated with the dependent variables, pertains 
the same problem with the dynamic panel model (a typical dynamic model has a 
lagged term for the dependent variable) and has an endogeneity problem. We then 
follow Arellano and Bover (1995) in the selection of instruments7 and propose the 
generalized method of moments (GMM) procedure to obtain consistent estimates.  
Specifications (2) and (3) will be examined with an additional term which is the 
interaction of NWC% and openness in order to demonstrate whether the effects of 
international openness could undermine the negative effect of labor market rigidity. 
To avoid an arbitrary setting of international competitiveness, we apply the terms of 
trade TOT (the export amount divided by the import amount) in addition to openness 
to represent the international competitiveness as a robustness check of the 
interaction term. The coefficient predictions are as follows. First, the effect of 
NWC% on GDP per capita is negative. This indicates that the increases in NWC%, 
6 Conditional convergence hypothesis: Poor economies grow faster in terms of their GDP per capita 
than richer economies once we control the determinants of the steady state, i.e., investment and 
population growth (Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 2004). 
7Baltagi (2008) has details on p.155. 
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implying an increase in labor market rigidity, lead to a deterioration in output due to 
the rising labor costs. Second, the impact of NWC% on the growth of per capita 
GDP is also negative, meaning that the higher the labor market rigidity, the slower 
the economic growth. Finally, the interaction term of NWC% and openness is 
positive, which implies that encouraging openness balances the negative impact of 
labor market rigidity. 
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4. Empirical Analysis 
As described earlier, an increase in labor market rigidity could result in a 
deterioration of output and the growth rate, on the one hand, and on the other hand 
an increase in the degree of openness could alleviate the negative impacts of labor 
market rigidity. We then examine these possibilities empirically in this section. The 
empirical strategies include the following. First, for comparison purposes, we 
employ time series data for individual countries to estimate specification (2) and 
obtain the individual countries’ marginal effects of labor market rigidity towards 
output. However, our time-series data has their limitations in terms of a small 
sample size. Thus, the second strategy involves estimating the four countries 
collectively. In addition to ordinary fixed effect estimators, we also consider the 
possible endogeneity by adopting union density and the manufacturing share of GDP 
as instrument variables and applying GMM to obtain consistent estimates. Third, we 
evaluate (3) to obtain the relationship between rigidity and growth. Note that all 
variables, with the exception of log variables, are standardized to reduce the number 
of decimal places for each coefficient. 
Table 2 represents the results for individual countries. These results suggest that 
the increases in labor market institutions have a negative impact on output both in 
South Korea and Taiwan. In Taiwan, a one standard deviation increase in NWC% 
significantly generates a 0.103 decline in GDP per capita. Taiwan has a larger 
marginal effect in relation to NWC% compared to South Korea, which implies that 
the variation in labor market rigidity has a greater impact on the output for Taiwan. 
This is not surprising when we look at the evolution of NWC%. In Fig 1, NWC% for 
South Korea falls dramatically in 1997 and declines steadily afterwards in 
accordance with the economic crisis (a lower labor benefit results in a decrease in 
the labor cost to maintain output and productivity) and this kind of adjustment can 
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not be achieved without efficient negotiations between labor, firms and the 
government. Thus, the labor market adjustment, and the negotiation mechanism 
between these three parties, is more efficient in South Korea than in Taiwan, which 
results in the output of South Korea being less affected by changes in labor market 
regulations. Furthermore, physical capital and human capital have the expected 
positive signs as the capital expenditure with GDP per capita. Openness is also 
positive in relation to GDP per capita. The inflation control variable, GDP deflator, 
is not significant. Government expenditure is negative since it is mainly related to 
taxation, which could burden output (Bleaney and Nishiyama, 2002). In addition, 
the effects of NWC% are insignificant in Hong Kong and Singapore compared to 
Taiwan and South Korea, which implies that labor market rigidity in 
manufacturing-intensive countries tends to affect output more in that stronger unions 
tend to seek stickier labor protection that will increase labor market rigidity and 
hamper output (Besley and Burgess, 2004). Although the coefficients in individual 
countries are in line with past studies and our argument, one might have doubts over 
whether the sample size could lead to inconsistent estimates. Therefore, we examine 
the four countries collectively to increase the credibility of the evidence. 
Table 3 presents our main results regarding the relationship between labor 
market rigidity and output. Columns (1) and (2) present the estimates using ordinary 
least square estimators with consideration of individual fixed effects while columns 
(3) and (4) adjust for possible endogeneity, heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation. 
The possible endogeneity of NWC% is also corrected by including union density and 
manufacturing’s share of GDP as instrument variables, because the two variables are 
highly correlated with NWC% (Besley and Burgess, 2004), but are not directly 
related to output. Weak instrument and over-identification tests are also provided.  
A quick look at columns (1) and (2), despite all of the variables being 
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consistent with our argument, however, reveals that the two specifications almost 
reject the CRTS null hypothesis8 at the 1% level of significance, which reminds us 
of the possibility of a few problems in terms of the OLS analysis. Given the 
limitations of OLS, we apply GMM and instrument variables to correct for the 
possible endogeneity problem and adjustments are also made for heteroskedasticity 
and autocorrelation. In column (3), NWC% is negatively correlated with output with 
a marginal effect of 0.13, which is in line with the literature (Crafts, 2006; Loayza et 
al., 2005) which argues that the labor market rigidity has a negative influence on 
output through a few different channels, including the increase in labor cost that 
lowers the optimal output, and the investors perceives future benefit cutback and 
consequently to hold back their investment. Physical capital is positively and 
significantly related to output, implying the accumulation of capital, which rises 
with GDP increments. The rise in openness also increases GDP as the four 
economies are by nature internationally trade-dependent. Therefore, the increases in 
international trade certainly result in higher output. The GDP deflator and 
government have the expected positive and negative signs that coincide with the 
findings of past studies. Furthermore, our estimates also show that the law of CRTS 
cannot be rejected, which eliminates the concern to apply the output function to 
country-level data. The over-identification and weak identification tests are passed, 
and an F-value greater than 10 proves the validity of the instrumental variables.  
Column (4) includes an interaction term for NWC% and openness to observe 
how the effect of international competitiveness offsets the effect of labor market 
rigidity. A one standard deviation increase in NWC% reduces GDP per capita by 
0.116(-0.117+0.068*0.005) while the rise in openness increases GDP per capita by 
0.104(0.104+0.068*0.007). In addition, in column (5) we also include the terms of 
8 Null hypothesis 𝛼0 + 𝛼1=1. 
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trade (TOT) as an alternative proxy for international competitiveness. The sign of the 
interaction term for TOT and NWC% is positive which is again in line with our 
argument. Given that other variables have with same signs as in column (3), it is 
shown that the interplay of openness with NWC% has a positive effect on output, 
which implies that the negative effect of NWC% can to some extent be offset by the 
effect of openness.  
As mentioned in the second section, the increases in NWC% and labor market 
rigidity mainly cause the increases in labor costs, as well as the increases marginal 
cost of production, reduction in the optimal output and the investments of firms. On 
the other hand, the increases in openness interact with labor market rigidity. The 
increase in the degree of trade openness, for example, allows firms to access 
substitutes for labor from imports and thus firms are able to adjust their labor 
demand (Hasan et al., 2007) and labor cost to outweigh the increased labor cost 
caused by the increases in labor market rigidity. Moreover, under certain degrees of 
openness, labor market rigidity could push firms to replace the labor share with 
capital and become more capital-intensive, which would further increase output. In 
addition, the increases of international exposure due to the greater international 
openness helps to introduce/invest in new technological work place 
practices/management which turn out to undermine union power (labor market 
rigidity) and cause unions to cooperate in enhancing output. To sum up, encouraging 
the degree of openness partially outweighs the negative impacts of NWC%, which 
again echoes the existing literature (Nickell and Layard, 1999).  
Turning to economic growth, the estimates are shown in Table 4. The 
coefficients are similar to the results in Table 3 with the exception that the dependent 
variable is in growth form. Obviously, the increases in NWC% can lead to a 
deterioration in economic growth via a reduction in capital accumulation, i.e., an 
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upswing in labor market rigidity, which increases the labor cost, holds back firms’ 
investment and affects capital accumulation (Besley and Burgess, 2004). 
Furthermore, this result is in line with the literature in that the key solution to the 
negative impacts of labor market rigidity is to improve international competition by 
increasing the degree of international trade openness, which is also proved again by 
the interaction term in columns (2) and (4).  
Collectively, by employing econometric techniques for different types of 
specifications, consistent results have been obtained in that the labor market rigidity 
not only leads to a deterioration in output but also economic growth. This is because 
labor market rigidity can directly raise labor costs and reduce profit and output, and 
furthermore reduce the incentives of firms to invest and accumulate capital. Note 
that even though we include heterogeneity in our sample, i.e. Singapore, which has 
very a different evolution for NWC%, the same result remains. This makes our 
argument even more robust. On the other hand, we empirically prove that an 
improvement in competitiveness among countries by encouraging a greater degree 
of openness balances the negative impact due to labor market rigidity. The results 
have a crucial policy implication that either directly reduces the labor market rigidity 
or maintains the status quo in the labor market by encouraging a degree of openness 
that outweighs the impact due to rigidity. 
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5. Conclusion 
In the past several decades, the labor market rigidity in Europe has been 
attributed to poorly designed labor market institutions and a deterioration in 
economic performance. In contrast to past studies, we shed light on the four Asian 
tigers. We argue that the improvement in labor market conditions, driven by the 
rapid economic growth from the 1960s to the 1990s, consequently resulted in an 
increase in the degree of labor market rigidity. More importantly, the adverse effect 
of the increased labor market rigidity was that it could conversely hinder output and 
economic growth, which would make it a potential problem in the future. 
Labor market rigidity undermines output and growth through a number of 
channels. First, the increases in labor rigidity are equivalent to the rises in labor 
costs, which reduce profits and the optimal output. Second, when firms perceive that 
the firm could be deprived of its expected profits from investing by labor, they may 
then withdraw the investment. The reduction in investment hampers the capital 
accumulation and damages the economic growth. Finally, the increase in union 
bargaining could form a strong barrier against the introduction of new technologies 
in the work place, which undermines productivity. On the other hand, granted that 
the rigidity hampers economic performance, it is also suggested that the increased 
degree of openness to international trade to improve national competitiveness could 
interact and mitigate the negative impacts of labor market rigidity on output and 
growth. This is because increases in openness enable firms to find substitutes to 
counter their rising labor costs, give outward pressure to union (undermine labor 
market rigidity) for enhancing productivity, and the increasing openness could of 
itself also raise output and profits that would in turn reduce the share of labor costs. 
Moreover, the openness brings the possibility of access of foreign capital substitutes, 
which causes firms to replace labor with capital and become capital-intensive when 
23 
 
facing the increments of labor market rigidity. This may in turn enhance capital 
accumulation and economic growth. 
By employing data from four Asian tigers, this study provides empirical 
evidence in support of the aforementioned arguments. We propose an econometric 
technique that obtains consistent results showing the rises in labor market rigidity to 
be negatively correlated with output and economic growth. By including the 
interaction term for NWC% and openness, we go further to show that the increases 
in openness can also balance the negative impacts from rigidity. This provides a 
critical insight into the policy implications for governments that attempt to mitigate 
the negative impacts of labor market rigidity: they could either directly reduce labor 
market rigidity or retain the current labor market institutions while at the same time 
nurturing an increasing degree of openness.  
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Table 1 NWC% and GDP per capita growth five-year average 
 
HK KOR SGR TW 
Year NWC% 
GDP per 
capita 
growth 
NWC% 
GDP per 
capita 
growth 
NWC% 
GDP per 
capita 
growth 
NWC% 
GDP per 
capita 
growth 
1980-1984 3.3 5.3 9.9 6.5 26.1 5.5 7.4 5.3 
1985-1989 3.9 6.1 10.1 8.1 19.0 5.0 7.5 7.1 
1990-1994 4.6 4.3 15.5 6.8 20.1 5.8 7.7 6.3 
1995-1999 5.2 -0.2 22.6 3.7 19.5 2.5 12.4 4.5 
2000-2004 7.8 3.8 23.7 4.8 14.9 4.1 13.2 3.3 
2005-2010 8.5 3.8 17.7 3.5 13.9 3.3 14.1 3.9 
 
 
Figure 1 Non-Wage Cost as Percentage of Total Compensation Cost (NWC%) 
in Hong Kong, Korea, Singapore and Taiwan 
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Table 2 Non-Wage Cost % and Output for Individual Countries 
 
HK KOR SGR TW 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent variable: log GDP per capita 
NWC% 0.024 -0.067*** -0.006 -0.103* 
 
(0.079) (0.01) (0.012) (0.05) 
log k 0.670*** 0.751*** 0.504*** 0.824*** 
 
(0.182) (0.097) (0.093) (0.096) 
log lifeexpec 0.626 0.384* 0.983*** 0.259 
 
(0.438) (0.215) (0.229) (0.207) 
log edu -0.019 -0.054 0.002 0.14 
 
(0.057) (0.038) (0.026) (0.14) 
openness 0.107** 0.043 0.106*** 0.279* 
 
(0.039) (0.097) (0.014) (0.154) 
GDP deflator 0.022 -0.00039 0.229*** -0.028 
 
(0.03) (0.046) (0.046) (0.072) 
government -0.18*** -0.022 -0.04** 0.013 
 
(0.03) (0.022) (0.019) (0.027) 
p-value  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
Obs 31 31 31 30 
** Significant at the 5% level; standard errors are reported in parentheses. The estimates are evaluated 
using the Newey method which adjusts possible autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity. Note that all 
variables, with the exception of log variables, are standardized to reduce the number of decimal places 
for the coefficients. 
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Table 3 Non-Wage Cost % and Output for the Aggregate Sample  
 
OLS GMM 
 
log GDP per capita log GDP per capita 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
NWC% -0.036* -0.038* -0.126*** -0.117*** -0.107*** 
 
(0.015) (0.012) (0.025) (0.024) (0.021) 
log k 0.607** 0.742*** 0.897*** 1.023*** 0.883*** 
 
(0.119) (0.104) (0.103) (0.117) (0.102) 
log lifeexpec 0.438 -0.082 -0.973 -0.874 -1.979** 
 
(0.557) (0.378) (0.725) (0.708) (0.715) 
log edu -0.091 -0.056 -0.059 -0.01 -0.061 
 
(0.052) (0.029) (0.041) (0.035) (0.038) 
openness 0.043 0.034 0.144*** 0.104*** 0.145*** 
 
(0.038) (0.03) (0.045) (0.048) (0.041) 
GDP deflator 0.02 0.031 0.078*** 0.062** 0.07** 
 
(0.026) (0.025) (0.026) (0.025) (0.022) 
government -0.064* -0.067** -0.084*** -0.085*** -0.069*** 
 
(0.021) (0.019) (0.019) (0.017) (0.016) 
openness*NWC% 
 
0.059* 
 
0.068***  
  
(0.019) 
 
(0.026)  
TOT*NWC% 
    
0.025** 
     
(0.01) 
Time effect yes yes yes yes yes 
Fixed effect yes yes yes yes yes 
Adjusted R-sq 0.9934 0.9944 0.9834 0.9864 0.9879 
P-value  0.000 0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
CRTS test reject reject not reject not reject not reject 
Weak identification 
test(F)   
12.149 11.681 19.21 
Overidentification test 
  
not reject not reject not reject 
Obs 123 123 108 108 108 
** Significant at the 5% level; standard errors are reported in parentheses. The constant term is not reported. Columns 
(1) and (2) are the OLS estimates. Possible heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation, as well as the endogeneity problem 
(via GMM) have been corrected in columns (3) and (4). The time effect is included in the form of a time dummy in 
five-year intervals. The instrumental variables here are union density and the share of manufacturing in GDP which 
have all passed the weak instrument tests. (STATA code: xtreg2). Note that all variables, with the exception of the log 
variables, are standardized to reduce the number of decimal places for the coefficients.  
 
Table 4 Non-Wage Cost % and Economic Growth for the Aggregate Sample 
Dependent variable: 
1 year Growth 
GDP per Capita 
Dependent variable: 
5 year Growth 
GDP per Capita 
 
(1) (2) 
 
(3) (4) 
△ NWC% 
-4.405** -9.564*** 
△5 NWC% 
-3.499*** -3.876*** 
(1.802) (3.434) (1.706) (1.209) 
△Log k 
1.054*** 0.813*** 
△5 Log k 
0.039 0.24* 
(0.247) (0.13) (0.128) (0.13) 
△Log lifeexpect 
1.775** 1.858*** 
△5Log lifeexpect 
-2.046 -3.107 
(0.823) (0.711) (2.376) (2.191) 
△Log education 
-1.235 -1.193 
△5Log education 
0.061 0.01 
(0.817) (0.862) (0.107) (0.059) 
△ openness 
7.932** 1.074 
△5 openness 
6.007** 2.526 
(3.38) (2.942) (2.911) (2.515) 
△ GDP deflator 
7.746 -3.138 
△5 GDP deflator 
7.32 1.984 
(11.417) (8.578) (5.418) (4.392) 
△ government 
-7.044*** -5.931** 
△5 government 
-5.463*** -5.171*** 
(2.75) (2.687) (0.896) (1.174) 
△ (openness*NWC%)  
15.539*** 
△5 (openness*NWC%)  
9.923*** 
 
(1.272) 
 
(2.763) 
L. log y -5.912*** -2.615 L5. log y -28.056*** -20.631*** 
 
(2.116) (2.045) 
 
(6.43) (3.992) 
Time effect yes yes Time effect yes yes 
Fixed effect yes yes Fixed effect yes yes 
Overidentification 
test 
not rejected not rejected Overidentification test not rejected not rejected 
P-value  0.000  0.000 P-value  0.000  0.000 
Obs 115 115 Obs 103 103 
** Significant at the 5% level; standard errors are reported in parentheses. We apply the dynamic GMM of Arellano and 
Bond (1995) as the methodology (STATA code: xtabond2). The time effect is included in the form of a time dummy in 
five-year intervals. Note that all variables, with the exception of the log variables, are standardized to reduce the number 
of decimal places for the coefficients. 
  
Appendix A1 
Variable Definition #Observation Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Data source 
y GDP per capita 123 16097  8077  3358  35537  KILM; National Statistics of R.O.C. 
NWC% 
Non-Wage Cost as % of Total 
wage cost 
123 12.921  6.640  3.200  29.600  KILM 
k capital stock per capita 123 33449  16891  6549  68744  
datamarket, (population as denominator, 
data from WDI and National Statistics of 
R.O.C.) 
lifeexpec life expectancy 123 76  4  66  83  WDI; National Statistics of R.O.C. 
edu 
education as % of gross 
national income 
123 3.634  1.323  1.662  6.730  WDI; National Statistics of R.O.C. 
openness 
trade (exports and imports) as 
% of GDP 
123 200.865  132.581  52.670  460.470  WDI; National Statistics of R.O.C. 
GDP deflator GDP deflator 123 82.968  23.043  26.779  129.450  WDI; National Statistics of R.O.C. 
government 
government consumption as % 
of GDP 
123 11.339  2.811  5.620  17.600  WDI; National Statistics of R.O.C. 
log y log GDP per capita 123 9.544  0.565  8.119  10.478  KILM; National Statistics of R.O.C. 
log k log capital stock per capita 123 10.259  0.611  8.787  11.138  
datamarket, (population as denominator, 
data from WDI and National Statistics of 
R.O.C.) 
log lifeexpec log life expectancy 123 4.331  0.050  4.187  4.417  WDI; National Statistics of R.O.C. 
log edu 
log education as % of gross 
national income 
123 1.231  0.338  0.508  1.907  WDI; National Statistics of R.O.C. 
standardized NWC% 
standardized Non-Wage Cost 
as % of Total wage cost 
123 0 1.001  -1.459  2.522  KILM 
standardized openness 
standardized export and import 
shares in GDP 
123 0 1.002  -1.114  1.966  WDI; National Statistics of R.O.C. 
standardized GDP 
deflator 
standardized GDP deflator 123 0 0.948  -2.279  1.947  WDI; National Statistics of R.O.C. 
standardized 
government 
standardized government 
consumption as % of GDP 
123 0 0.987  -2.013  2.195  WDI; National Statistics of R.O.C. 
 
